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Problem area 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) emerge as a viable, 
operational technology for 
potential civil and commercial 
applications in the National 
Airspace System (NAS). Although 
this new type of technology 
presents great potential, it also 
introduces a need for an analysis 
of its safety impact on the NAS. 
On-going efforts to develop 
rules and requirements for UAS 
Sense and Avoid (SAA) 
underlines the need to 
understand to what extent 
existing regulations cover the 
related hazards. The objective of 
this study is to develop and 
apply a generic methodology to 
identify risk controls that the 
current regulations provide to 
mitigate the hazards and causal 
factors in a certain domain, new 
operation or technology.  
 
Description of work 
This study presents a systems-
level approach to analyse the 
safety impact of introducing a 
new technology and to 
determine a regulatory baseline. 
Within the context of this study, 
a system-level perspective refers 
to looking at the air transport 
system as a whole from a high-
level of abstraction as a system. 
 
The proposed methodology is 
applied to the (near) mid-air 
collision under IFR (Instrument 
Flight Rules) operations. First, a 
set of hazards and underlying 
causal factors for (near) mid-air 
collision risk is determined 
based on a causal risk model. 
Next, the associated regulatory 
risk controls are determined  by 
a review of a selected set of 
aviation rules and regulations by 
means of subject matter 
experts. 
 
Results and conclusions 
This study presents a 
methodology that can be used 
to define a minimum set of risk 
controls based on current rules 
and regulations to control or 
mitigate hazards related to a 
certain operation or new 
technology. The methodology is 
applied to the domain of mid-air 
collision and the resulting 
baseline is comprised of three 
hazards with 60 underlying 
causal factors, and a large 
number of applicable regulatory 
risk controls. The analysis of the 
risk controls indicates to what 
extent the current regulations 
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act as risk controls for hazards 
associated with mid-air collision 
in the NAS. This provides an 
understanding of potential gaps 
in the existing regulatory 
structure, by identifying the 
hazards and underlying causal 
factors for which current 
regulations provide potentially 
no or limited mitigation. 
 
The results show that some 
hazards and causal factors are 
well covered by multiple 
rules/regulations. On the other 
hand the study demonstrates 
that with this approach one is 
able to identify possible gaps in 
regulations to control the risk of 
certain hazards. The resulting 
set of risk controls is not only 
applicable to manned operations 
in the NAS but will also provide 
a minimum, but possibly not 
sufficient, set of risk controls to 
mitigate (near) mid-air collision 
risk for UAS operations. 
 
The value of the presented 
approach lies in the structured 
analysis to identify the existing 
regulatory coverage for the 
hazards present in a certain 
domain. In particular, the 
methodology supports the 
analysis regarding the extent to 
which identified hazards for a 
particular domain are covered by 
existing regulations. Thus, the 
proposed approach facilitates 
the identification of gaps in the 
current regulations for a specific 
risk or domain. 
 
Applicability 
The developed generic 
methodology could be applied 
to a new technology or 
operation to identify hazards 
and corresponding regulatory 
risk controls on a system-level. It 
is applied to mid-air collision 
domain, but that could easily be 
extended to cover other areas of 
interest, such as command, 
control, and communication for 
UAS integration into the NAS. As 
such, this study contributes to 
development of standards for 
safe integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace. 
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Abstract16
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) emerge as a viable, operational technology17
for potential civil and commercial applications in the National Airspace System18
(NAS). Although this new type of technology presents great potential, it also19
introduces a need for a thorough inquiry into its safety impact on the NAS.20
This study presents a systems-level approach to analyze the safety impact of21
introducing a new technology, such as UAS, into the NAS. Utilizing Safety22
Management Systems (SMS) principles and the existing regulatory structure, it23
outlines a methodology to determine a regulatory safety baseline for a speciﬁc24
area of interest regarding a new aviation technology, such as UAS Sense and25
Avoid. The proposed methodology is then employed to determine a baseline set26
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2 A. Oztekin and R. Wever
of hazards and causal factors for the UAS Sense and Avoid problem domain and27
associated regulatory risk controls.28
66.1 Introduction29
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) present great potential for civil and commercial30
applications in non-segregated airspace. Unrestricted UAS access into the National31
Airspace System (NAS) of the United States requires a thorough examination of its32
safety impact on the current operations in the NAS. In addition, a lack of regulatory33
guidance is considered an obstacle against achieving the full potential that UAS has34
to offer (FAA Flight Plan 2009–2013; Weibela and Hansman 2005). Recognizing35
the need for regulations and guidance material, aviation regulators initiated efforts36
to develop policies and establish requirements, procedures, and standards that will37
support UAS technology development and certiﬁcation to enable safe operations38
of UAS. In the United States, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is working39
closely with the UAS community through RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-40
203) to deﬁne the Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS).41
Similarly, EUROCAE Working Group 73 (WG-73) is coordinating European efforts42
to deliver standards and guidance that will ensure the safety and reliability of un-43
manned aircraft missions operating in non-segregated airspace (EUROCAE 2009).44
These efforts are also being informally coordinated to facilitate harmonization45
(RTCA 2010).46
The integration of UAS into the NAS presents various unique challenges, which47
will require novel and mostly platform-speciﬁc technological solutions. However,48
it can be argued that demonstration of airworthiness of these technologies will not49
present the only barrier to the introduction of UAS in the NAS. The difﬁculty that50
UAS is currently facing arises in obtaining authorization to enter and use civil51
airspace. This originates from the legitimate concern that unmanned aircraft may52
collide with other aircraft. Given the consensus that there will be no dedicated53
airspace for UAS operations, some authorities place the primary role of avoiding54
any collision between UAS and manned aircraft solely to the UAS. For all practical55
purposes, the UAS is, therefore, expected to have full responsibility to sense other56
aircraft and take effective evasive action. In this context, “see and avoid” or “sense57
and avoid” (SAA) emerges as one of the areas, which introduces new challenges58
and technologies compared to manned aviation and raises attention of regulators as59
well as the UAS manufacturers and future operators.60
The body of current research projects on sense and avoid in the UAS domain61
mainly focuses on technology development and demonstration to provide a portfolio62
of workable technological solutions for the see and avoid concept. As compared to63
technology development, research on UAS safety risk analysis with an emphasis64
on SAA is still in its infancy. Most current UAS safety studies perform the risk65
analysis at a very detailed level based, on limited event or occurrence data. Examples66
of such research are preliminary functional hazard assessments (Hayhurst et al.67
2007), event-based safety models of UAS (Weibel 2005), and simulation-based68
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2012-439 
December 2012  3 
 
 
2 66.2 DEFINING A SAFETY BASELINE 
66 Development of a Regulatory Safety Baseline for UAS Sense and Avoid 3
encounter models (Kochenderfer et al. 2008). However, a systems-level safety69
analysis focusing on the regulatory aspects of the SAA concept for UAS operations70
with an emphasis on future NAS access is lacking.71
This study outlines a systems-level safety risk analysis framework for the SAA72
concept.Within the context of this study, a system-level perspective refers to looking73
at the air transport system as a whole from a high-level of abstraction as a system, or74
a system of subsystems. Thus, NAS may be considered as the system and UAS as a75
subsystem. In particular, the proposed framework presents a novel regulatory-based76
and integrated approach to understand hazards associated with midair collision77
risk and SAA and provides an analysis of current regulatory controls related to78
this topic. Utilizing Safety Management Systems (SMS) principles, the proposed79
framework establishes a systems-level safety analysis approach based on the FAA80
regulatory requirements to support the safe integration of UAS into the NAS with a81
particular focus on “sense and avoid.” The framework is intended to provide insight82
in risks and risk controls in current regulations when integrating new and complex83
technologies into the NAS while meeting the FAA’s SMS mandates. This study84
divides potential operations in the NAS into two main subgroups: ﬂights conducted85
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). The analysis86
and results presented here were developed for IFR operations.87
In this study, the terms “hazard” and “causal factor” are used within the following88
context: A hazard is a condition, object, or activity with the potential of causing89
injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or90
reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function. Hazards occur usually due91
to several causal factors. In general, hazards are considered at a higher level of92
abstraction, whereas causal factors are of a more detailed level.93
The research presented here is based on the concepts and ideas that have been94
introduced in (Luxhøj et al. 2009, 2010; Oztekin and Luxhøj 2008, 2009). The next95
section provides background information on these concepts that are instrumental to96
the analysis, results, and discussion presented. Consequently, the proposed approach97
is illustrated by using a causal model for midair collision as the basis to develop a98
safety baseline for the SAA concept. Finally, an analysis on the SAA safety baseline99
is presented along with some concluding remarks.100
66.2 Deﬁning a Safety Baseline101
In order to regulate a new technology that is to operate within an already-established102
and well-regulated infrastructure, such as NAS, without risking stiﬂing its potential,103
one needs to understand existing safety criteria required to achieve the level of safety104
associated with the current operations. Within the context of the NAS, the existing105
safety criteria are the applicable aviation rules and regulations governing everyday106
manned ﬂight and ﬂight support and management operations of commercial or107
noncommercial nature. In this context, aviation rules and regulations act as controls108
against potential risks and provide a baseline for safe operations in the NAS.109
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More speciﬁcally, regulations are risk controls that constitute a safety baseline110
for all operations in the NAS. All aircraft operating in the NAS have to satisfy111
requirements set by Title 14 Code of Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR) and112
follow supporting guidance material. 14 CFR provides the risk controls for safe113
operations and establishes a baseline for all prospective operation in the NAS.114
For UAS technology and operations in nonsegregated airspace, current regulations115
(14CFR) apply. Thus, understanding the risk controls as deﬁned by 14 CFR and116
outlining a baseline set of hazards and underlying causal factors that existing117
regulations control lie at the crux of the regulatory safety baseline concept (Oztekin118
and Lee 2011; Oztekin et al. 2011).119
66.3 Challenge with the UAS120
Limited availability of data on emergent nature of UAS operations introduces a121
challenge for the safety analysis and assessment of UAS operations. Conventional122
quantitative safety risk analysis techniques, essentially event-driven and largely123
built upon past experience and vast amount of historical data, may not provide124
adequate information for risk controls necessary for emerging technologies such125
as UAS. In the absence of operational data, it becomes very difﬁcult to perform a126
systems-level safety analysis of UAS using conventional quantitative safety analysis127
methodologies. However, this situation can be considered as typical for any new128
technology with a limited accumulation of historic operational data. In this context,129
it is argued that a new approach may add valuable insight to understand the safety130
impact of emerging UAS operations on NAS. This new approach should not rely131
on historic data about the new technology, therefore would not be hindered by the132
lack of it. Furthermore, it should also assume a systems-level perspective while133
performing the safety analysis. Thus, a successful attempt to understand the safety134
impact of emerging UAS operations of civil/commercial nature can be achieved135
through a higher systems-level approach, which takes into account the problem136
domain as a whole. In this case, the problem domain in question is the NAS and137
it should be treated as a single complex system. Subsystems, such as Air Trafﬁc138
Control (ATC), Airmen, Aircraft, Flight Operations, and Airspace constituting the139
NAS are interdependent and their interactions determine safety that permeates the140
whole system and deﬁnes minimum mandatory safety requirements for the NAS.141
These minimum set of requirements constitute a mandatory baseline for conducting142
safe operations in the NAS. A systematic approach for the identiﬁcation of such a143
safety baseline will provide guidance to understand systems-level safety impact of a144
new technology, such as UAS, onto the NAS. Utilizing the safety baseline concept,145
Regulatory-based Causal Factor Framework (RCFF) (Luxhøj et al. 2009, 2010;146
Oztekin and Luxhøj 2008, 2009; Oztekin and Lee 2011; Oztekin et al. 2011, 2012),147
provides such a systematic approach. Although RCFF is a new and intuitive148
approach, one should make it clear that it does not replace but complements existing149
qualitative and quantitative methods by recognizing existing rules and regulations150
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Fig. 66.1 Inductive reasoning versus deductive reasoning
covering the problem domain as key components of a system-level qualitative safety151
risk analysis framework.152
Data-centric methodologies beneﬁt from inductive reasoning when modeling153
the problem domain and the system in question. Although inductive reasoning has154
been successfully employed for data-rich systems for which extensive collections155
of case studies exist, due to similar reasoning outlined above, inductive frameworks156
may not be a good ﬁt to understand and model new technology with limited157
accident/incident data. In this context, this study adopts deductive reasoning to158
understand the problem. Figure 66.1 illustrates deductive approach as compared159
to inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is a top-down approach, which puts160
emphasis on modeling the system based on its higher and more general components.161
When applied to the area of safety analysis, contrary to inductive approach where162
the analysis would be based on individual accident/incident cases and related data,163
a deductive approach will study the system as a whole and focus on its higher-level164
components and their interactions. Thus, a deductive approach will concentrate on165
understanding the safety minimums and, using an engineering term, determine the166
boundary conditions for conducting safe operations within the system.167
66.4 Regulatory-based Causal Factor Framework168
The study presented in this chapter utilizes concepts introduced by the RCFF. In very169
broad terms, RCFF is a qualitative, systems-level approach to safety assessment170
based on deductive reasoning to construct a safety baseline for operations in the171
NAS in the United States. The basic concept relies on two fundamental premises:172
Aviation rules and regulations “Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)”173
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6 A. Oztekin and R. Wever
provide minimum mandatory requirements (i.e., risk controls) for safe operations174
in the NAS and various unrelated regulations interact to provide risk controls for175
hazards.176
14 CFR can be considered as the culmination of efforts by the larger aviation177
community to provide an inherent minimum level of safety for every single178
operation to be conducted within the NAS. This notion of minimum safety is179
outlined as rules and requirements by the 14 CFR, and every aircraft in the NAS180
has to operate above the minimums of this mandatory safety baseline. In this sense,181
regulations act as minimum controls for potential risks associated with operating in182
the NAS.183
However, individual regulations do not operate in a vacuum. When a speciﬁc184
aircraft or operation is concerned, a diverse collection of rules regulating different185
areas of the NAS interact to provide minimum requirements for safety as they apply186
to the speciﬁcs of the operation/aircraft in question. For example, issues related to187
certiﬁcation of aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller are regulated by 14 CFR Part188
21, whereas airworthiness standards for the aircraft and its components are outlined189
in Parts 21–33. Subchapter D of 14 CFR focuses on the issues of certiﬁcation and190
training of airmen and Subchapter E deﬁnes and partitions airspace, within which191
the proposed operation is set to take place. Thus, every single operation in the NAS,192
whether that particular type of operation has been conducted routinely for many193
years or it is the implementation of a new technology, is enveloped by a mandatory194
minimum safety baseline created collectively by various interacting rules regulating195
potential sources of various different hazards.196
The notion of interactions between various parts of the 14 CFR to provide a197
minimum mandatory safety risk controls is a simple yet powerful idea, which brings198
forth a new approach to understand and study safety in aviation. This intuitive199
idea, in fact, borrows from the fundamental principle of the interdisciplinary ﬁeld200
Systems Analysis. Formally, systems analysis is the dissection of a system into its201
component pieces for purposes of studying how those component pieces interact.202
In complex systems such as NAS, safety is the product of these interactions.203
However, a closer look at various current research efforts on UAS integration in204
the NAS reveals that such studies rarely explore potential interactions between their205
respective area of interest and various other components of the NAS, in a systematic206
fashion.207
The regulatory-based approach of RCFF takes cues from FAA’s own Safety208
Management System (SMS) process. FAA Policy Document on SMS Guidance209
(FAA 2008) states that210
. . . regulations will serve as risk control, if correctly applied in the context of the unique211
operational environments of service providers. Rule making process therefore should212
apply the concepts of safety risk management . . . They [regulations] should identify213
hazards . . . Compliance with the regulations would thus move beyond viewing them on as214
administrative requirements and into an environment where compliance entails effective215
control of clearly identiﬁed hazards. This would enhance the value of regulations as216
effective instruments of safety management. Regulations and subsequent oversight activities217
must be part of a strategy of risk control.218
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This understanding of regulation’s role coincides with the fundamental concepts219
that RCFF is built upon; namely, use regulations as risk controls, identify hazards220
based on risk controls, identify causal factors underlying hazards, determine221
potential interactions between causal factors (thus between risk controls). Within222
the context outlined in the FAA SMS Guidance, RCFF can also be used as part of223
an exploratory risk-based rule-making process as a future research initiative, where224
the impact of the current regulations as risk controls are evaluated on the safety225
baseline and shortcomings are identiﬁed and corrected.226
RCFF adopts a deductive, top-down approach to identify systems-level hazards227
and associated causal factors using regulations (i.e., 14 CFR) as risk controls. This228
approach is especially a good ﬁt for providing a system-level qualitative safety229
risk analysis of emerging technologies, such as UAS, where limited availability230
of case data poses a challenge. RCFF also proposes a methodology to deter-231
mine connections between potentially related causal factors, thereby creating an232
interlinked safety baseline. Ultimately, the RCFF safety baseline can be explored233
to understand the interactions between causal factors, as well as the dependencies234
between regulations (i.e., risk controls).235
The outcome of the RCFF process is the safety baseline: hazards, causal factors,236
and regulations as risk controls. The context and scope of the safety baseline is237
determined by the set of regulations included in the RCFF analysis. Hazards and238
causal factors are identiﬁed based on risk controls outlined by these regulations.239
The scope of an RCFF analysis and the extent of the resulting safety baseline can240
be adjusted both depth-wise and breadth-wise in terms of detail and coverage.241
Conceptually, the RCFF hierarchy closely follows the current regulatory struc-242
ture. At the very top of this hierarchy, covering the entire NAS, Federal Aviation243
Regulations (14 CFR) provide minimum risk controls for safe operations. Thus,244
an RCFF top-down modeling process starts with regulations, or rather, it accepts245
regulations as input. However, risk controls can also be found beyond 14CFR:246
orders, technical manuals, guidance material, even prior safety studies are among247
the source materials that can be used as risk controls to initiate the process for an248
RCFF-based analysis.249
The RCFF hierarchy including risk controls, hazards, causal factors, and linkages250
between them are stored in a database. A detailed discussion on the methodology251
used to construct an RCFF hierarchy based on the existing set of regulations and252
to populate the RCFF database is provided in Oztekin and Lee (2011) as part of a253
proof-of-concept study, where a potential utilization of the database is outlined. The254
high-level implementation of RCFF utilizes 14 CFR Parts as the basis to develop its255
hierarchy and the resulting system-level safety baseline (Oztekin and Lee 2011).256
66.5 Approach to Construction of a Safety Baseline for SAA257
Current regulations prescribe generic risk controls against midair collision and near258
midair collision risk. Under provisions that regulate operations near other aircraft,259
FAR Sect. 91.111 (b) states that “no person may operate an aircraft so close to260
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another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.” Additionally, FAR Sect. 91.113 (b)261
quoted below, explicitly uses language that includes the terms “see and avoid” and262
“well clear”: “When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation263
is conducted under instrument ﬂight rules or visual ﬂight rules, vigilance shall be264
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.265
When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall266
give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well267
clear.” Obviously, the need for UAS to comply with the SAA concept in the NAS268
extends well beyond these two 14 CFR sections and a more detailed analysis of269
regulations with a particular emphasis on current risk controls for hazards related to270
(near) midair collision is needed.271
See and Avoid can be used to assure separation from other aircraft and to avoid272
collisions in case separation failed. The SAA concept can be divided into two273
areas, namely, separation assurance and collision avoidance (Lacher et al. 2008).274
Separation assurance covers topics ranging from airspace structure and procedures275
to onboard alert systems such Trafﬁc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). On276
the other hand, collision avoidance entails the act of sensing and avoiding trafﬁc277
conﬂicts or executing the collision avoidance maneuver once all preceding protec-278
tive layers fail to provide the separation required. Most of the UAS SAA–related279
research focus on technology development that falls within the domain of collision280
avoidance. When it comes to understanding the safety impact of various interacting281
components of the NAS on the UAS SAA, there is more to it than sensor technology282
and algorithm development. Therefore a more integrated approach is needed to283
conduct a safety analysis of UAS SAA.284
The objective of this study is to deﬁne a safety baseline for (near) midair285
286 collisions and the SAA concept. In this study, the RCFF concept has been applied 
287 to identify risk controls that the current regulations provide to mitigate the hazards 
288 and causal factors related with (near) midair collisions and the SAA concept. The 
289 result is a set of risk controls derived from existing regulations that will not only 
290 be applicable to manned operations in the NAS but will also provide a minimum, 
291 but possibly not sufﬁcient set of risk controls to mitigate (near) midair collision risk 
292 for potential UAS operations. Operations conducted under instrument ﬂight rules 
293 (IFR) and visual ﬂight rules (VFR) have to be considered to develop a minimum 
294 mandatory baseline for SAA which applies to a wide range of trafﬁc encounters 
295 under all operational environments. The current study is focused on IFR operations 
296 only. 
In this context, the study presented in this chapter is composed of the following298
three phases:299
1. Identify a baseline set of hazards and underlying causal factors for (near)300
midair collisions and the SAA concept. A causal model developed and validated301
speciﬁcally for this topic is used as the starting point to identify a baseline set of302
regulatory risk controls.303
2. Identify risk controls for the causal factors. The risk controls are derived from304
existing regulations. The risk controls along with the hazards and causal factors305
constitute the safety baseline for preventing (near) midair collisions;306
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3. Perform an analysis of existing regulatory controls. The objective of the analysis307
is to quantify and understand the coverage that the identiﬁed regulatory risk308
controls provide to potentially mitigate the hazards and causal factors associated309
with the SAA safety baseline. Such an analysis also focuses on interactions310
between different domains of regulatory controls and helps to determine the311
coverage or gaps in regulatory material concerning regulating the new system,312
operation, etc.313
Since the RCFF exists conceptually and not yet as a full-scale application, it is not314
possible to apply RCFF directly to the SAA concept, as the set of associated causal315
factors, hazards, and risk controls is not available yet. Instead, a detailed causal316
model developed speciﬁcally for the issue at hand provided a good starting point to317
identify a set of hazards and causal factors and associated regulatory controls that318
could form the safety baseline for the midair collision risk and SAA concept.319
Considering that RCFF is a top-down framework, this “bottom-up” approach320
may seem inconsistent. However, the basic idea behind the RCFF is that regulations321
provide a set of risk controls for hazards (and causal factors); these regulations322
interact and their interactions can be identiﬁed through identifying dependencies323
between hazards (or between causal factors). The ultimate goal of RCFF is to324
determine risk controls and their interactions for the problem domain in question.325
Using existing knowledge about hazards and causal factors (i.e., a causal model) to326
identify the regulatory risk controls and their dependencies is still consistent with327
the RCFF concept.328
66.6 Causal Model for Midair Collision329
A causal model explains the functional and quantitative relationship between the330
various factors affecting risk in the Air Transport System (or NAS) or major parts331
of it. Generally speaking, such models allow the user to understand how, and how332
much, changes in a particular part of the ATS change the local as well as the overall333
safety risk of the ATS.334
The hazards and causal factors in relation to (near) midair collision and SAA for335
IFR operations were identiﬁed by means of an existing causal model, which was336
developed as part of the Causal Model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) study (Ale337
et al. 2005; CATS 2008). The CATS study was a major effort sponsored by the338
Dutch government and developed by a consortium of parties including the NLR-Air339
Transport Safety Institute. The aim of CATS was to understand the causal factors340
underlying the risks of commercial air transport. It is an integrated quantitative341
causal model that can be used for safety risk analysis and assessment in civil air342
transport. The backbone of CATS consists of 33 generic accident scenarios. Each343
accident scenario was modeled as an Event Sequence Diagram (ESD), a ﬂowchart344
which starts with an initiating event and progresses through pivotal event toward a345
set of possible outcomes (e.g., accident, incident, and continued ﬂight). Each path346
through the ﬂowchart is a scenario. Along each path, pivotal events are identiﬁed as347
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either occurring or not occurring. Fault Trees connect to the events in the ESD and348
represent the deeper, underlying causes of these events.349
The causal model is composed of a qualitative as well as a quantitative part. The350
qualitative part is formed by the ESD and Fault Tree structure deﬁning the accident351
scenario and causal pathways leading to different outcomes. In other words, event352
names and descriptions and the relationships between events, the model structure,353
constitute the qualitative model. The model was quantiﬁed using accident, incident,354
and occurrence data as well as expert judgments. It is crucial to maintain the context355
of the ESD and Fault Trees and avoid drastically revising language and model356
structure; otherwise the quantiﬁed model elements would no longer be valid.357
This study utilizes (near) midair collision ((N)MAC) as the system-level hazard358
to deﬁne the SAA problem domain. (N)MAC as an event has been fully studied to359
understand underlying hazards and causal factors using available occurrence data360
from aviation safety databases. Analysis indicated that the SAA problem domain361
in the NAS can be decomposed into two main operational sub-domains, namely,362
operations conducted under instrument ﬂight rules (IFR) and under visual ﬂight363
rules (VFR). All potential scenarios need to be studied to fully cover the problem364
domain and develop a minimum mandatory baseline for SAA which applies to365
all encounters under all operational environments. The resulting safety baseline366
for SAA will not only be applicable to manned operations in the NAS but will367
also provide a minimum, but possibly not sufﬁcient, set of risk controls to govern368
potential UAS-speciﬁc hazards.369
In this context, the study presented here is based on the MAC/NMAC encounters370
involving two aircraft-operated under IFR, thereby partially covering the operational371
domain of the NAS, as the current scope of this research.372
The ESD for midair collision is one of the 33 generic accident scenarios modeled373
in CATS and describes generically hazards and causal factors in relation to (near)374
midair collision and SAA for IFR operations. The initiating event is “aircraft are375
positioned on collision course” and the end states are “collision in midair” or376
“aircraft continues ﬂight.” The detailed speciﬁc or possible causes or contributing377
factors of the pivotal events in the ESD are added by Fault Trees underneath each378
pivotal event. The ESD models two layers of conﬂict detection and resolution: ATC379
and the ﬂight crew (supported by, e.g., collision avoidance systems and SAA). The380
models were developed by a combination of retrospective and prospective analysis.381
The retrospective analysis consisted of a detailed and structured analysis of aviation382
accidents, which demonstrate typical accident patterns. The prospective analysis is383
based on engineering knowledge and aviation operational domain experts to identity384
potential hazards and hazardous combinations of causal factors that may have not385
(yet) resulted in an accident.386
The ESD is representative for Part 121 operations with Part 25 aircraft and entails387
the encounter of two aircraft operating under IFR. It is composed of the initiating388
event and two pivotal events, and together with the associated Fault Trees, it has 29389
intermediate events and 61 base events, see Fig. 66.2.390
The ESD for midair collision is used as the basis to develop a minimum391
mandatory safety baseline for SAA. However since the scope of the midair collision392
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ATC fails to
detect and
resolve the
conflict
Aircraft are
positioned on
collision course
Flight crew
fails to detect
and resolve
the conflict (1)
Collision in
mid-air
Accident type: mid-air collision.
Flight phases: initial climb, en-route and approach.
Initiating event: aircraft are positioned on collision course.
Aircraft
continues
flight
Aircraft
continues
flight
yes
no
(1) This pivotal event includes the execution of ‘see-and-avoid’ principle and the response to
a Traffic Collision Avoidance System alert.
Fig. 66.2 Event sequence diagram used to develop the components of the SAA safety baseline
model is limited to IFR, only the portion of the SAA safety baseline that covers IFR393
operations within the NAS is modeled by the study presented here.394
The events constituting the Fault Tree supporting the ESD were originally395
deﬁned using short descriptive texts which outline the intended scope of the event396
within the context of the accident scenario in question. The causal model elements397
were reviewed by a group of subject matter experts (SMEs) to identify causal factors398
and hazards that will constitute the safety baseline for SAA in the NAS. During the399
course of the review process, the original language used to describe the events was400
also revised by the SMEs so as to ﬁt the terminology currently prevalent in the401
NAS. The review process resulted in 3 “system-level” hazards and 60 causal factors402
constituting the SAA safety baseline for IFR operations in the NAS.403
The set of hazards and causal factors are generic and applicable to both manned404
and unmanned aviation operations. Some causal factors may have a minor different405
interpretation in case of unmanned aircraft, without affecting the cause-effect406
relationship. For example, some causal factors may refer to “pilot” which can407
be interpreted as “UAS operator” without changing its cause-effect relationship.408
However, the identiﬁed set of causal factors should be reviewed in more detail409
to identify potential missing causal factors related to UAS-speciﬁc operations and410
technology.411
The original causal model for midair collision is composed of a qualitative412
as well as a quantitative part. The qualitative part is comprised of the ESD and413
Fault Tree structure deﬁning the accident scenario and causal pathways leading414
to different outcomes. In other words, event names and descriptions and how they415
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are placed in the model structure constitute the qualitative model. The model was416
quantiﬁed using accident, incident, and occurrence data as well as expert judgments.417
Thus, the causal model for midair collision, as a whole, represents a certain418
probability distribution. However, if it becomes necessary to include additional419
UAS-speciﬁc hazards as part of a future study, associated Fault Trees may also need420
to be revised quantitatively resulting in a new probability distribution representing421
the revised causal model.422
66.7 Approach to Identifying Regulatory Risk Controls for SAA423
Once a baseline set of hazards and causal factors was determined from the causal424
model, the next step was the identiﬁcation of existing regulations that provide425
potential controls to prevent and mitigate hazards and causal factors related to midair426
collision and SAA for IFR operations in the NAS.427
The SAA safety baseline presents a simple hierarchical structure. The regulation428
that explicitly mentions SAA as a safety requirement for conducting operations in429
the NAS (i.e., FAR Sect. 91.113-b) is at the very top of this hierarchy. Hazards430
identiﬁed for SAA branch out from Sect. 91.113(b), and individual causal factors431
are listed for each hazard. In this context, risk controls for hazards are identiﬁed432
through individual causal factors. In other words, risk controls are identiﬁed for433
individual causal factors, thus their connections to hazards are indicated through434
causal factors. Regulations (i.e., 14 CFR) also present a hierarchical structure.435
Fourteen CFR is grouped into subchapters. Subchapters are partitioned into Parts436
and Parts into subparts. Subparts are divided into sections. Speciﬁcity of information437
that a regulation provides increases as one moves toward the next lower level in438
the regulatory hierarchy. Since the safety baseline is comprised of a collection of439
very detailed causal factors, pertaining risk controls should also present a level of440
detail that is comparable with the information content of the safety baseline. Thus,441
for each causal factor, speciﬁc 14 CFR sections were identiﬁed as potential risk442
controls. Notional representation of the SAA safety baseline hierarchy based on the443
structure of the NMAC ESD is illustrated in Fig. 66.3.444
Due to resource constraints, this study limited the scope of the risk control445
identiﬁcation to 13 FAR Parts representing three major subchapters of 14 CFR as446
sources for potential risk controls. The FAR Parts and corresponding subchapters447
included in this study are listed below:448
Subchapter C – Aircraft:449
Part 21 – Certiﬁcation Procedures for Products and Parts450
Part 23 – Airworthiness Standards: Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter451
Category Airplanes452
Part 25 – Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes453
Part 27 – Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft454
Part 33 – Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines455
Part 34 – Fuel Venting and Exhaust Emission Requirements for Turbine Engine456
Powered Airplanes457
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Causal
FactorsHazards
Regulations-
14 CFR* 
SAA
91.113(b)
Hazard-1
Aircraft are positioned on
collision course
Hazard-2
ATC fails to detect and
resolve the conflict
Hazard-3
Flight crew fails to detect
and resolve conflict
CF60
Ineffective visual warning
on other aircraft
CF52
ACAS not installed
CF51
CF44
No STCA coverage
CF43
CF1
Strategic conflict
91.3
91.13
121.153
121.173
21.13
21...
23.
23.
Separation recovery
essential
ATCO fails to recover
separation in time
Fig. 66.3 Notional illustration of the SAA safety baseline
Part 43 – Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, And Alteration458
Subchapter D – Airmen:459
Part 61 – Certiﬁcation: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors460
Part 65 – Certiﬁcation: Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers461
Subchapter F – Air Trafﬁc and General Operations:462
Part 91 – General Operating and Flight Rules463
Subchapter G – Air Carriers and Operators for Compensation or Hire: Certiﬁ-464
cation and Operations:465
Part 121 – Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, And Supplemental Opera-466
tions467
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Part 135 – Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and468
Rules Governing Persons On Board Such Aircraft469
Subchapter H – Schools and Other Certiﬁcated Agencies:470
Part 145 – Repair Stations471
Note that the Parts listed above are some of the most prominent rules regulating472
aviation safety. Thus they provide extensive coverage in terms of risk controls for473
the NAS.474
The process of identifying section-level risk controls for the identiﬁed hazards475
and causal factors involved multiple knowledge elicitation sessions with Subject476
Matter Experts (SMEs), with extensive background and expertise on aviation-477
related rulemaking, regulatory oversight, as well as operations. The sessions were478
moderated in a structured manner with the participation of multiple SMEs and an479
aggregate approachwas employed to determine potential risk controls for individual480
causal factors across the 13 FAR Parts mentioned before. The data sample provided481
below in Table 66.1 illustrates the type and content of the data that has been482
compiled as the result of the elicitation process to identify risk controls for the SAA483
safety baseline.484
Table 66.1 Risk controls identiﬁed for CFs #4 and #5 of Hazard #1. Only risk controls from Parts
65, 91, 121, and 135 are shown
Hazard #1
Aircraft are positioned on collision
t5.1 course Risk controls
t5.2 # Causal factor Deﬁnition Part 91 Part 135 Part 65 Part 121 Part 61
t5.3 4 Inadequate
strategic
surveillance
picture
The radar picture is
inadequate to allow the
Planning Controller to
identify the pre-tactical
conﬂict, e.g.,
incomplete trafﬁc
picture, picture with
overlapping labels, or
too much trafﬁc for the
display system
N/A 135.18 N/A 121.357,
121.356,
121.360
N/A
t5.4 5 Inadequate
ﬂight plan data
Flight plan data is
inadequate to allow the
Planning Controller to
identify the pre-tactical
conﬂict, e.g., incorrect
ﬂight plan, ﬂight plan
insufﬁcient to identify
conﬂicts, ﬂight plan
strips obtained too late,
or aircraft not
following ﬂight plan
91.173,
91.111,
91.113,
91.123
135.345,
135.347
65.31,
65.33,
65.35,
65.37,
65.39,
65.45,
65.49,
65.50
121.395 61.87,
61.93
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66.8 Analysis of Regulatory isk Controls485
This section presents the analysis of risk controls that were identiﬁed according to486
the methodology outlined above. First, the identiﬁed risk controls are analyzed from487
a higher systems-level perspective and its interaction with the NAS as a whole. Next,488
individual causal factors are analyzed to achieve a more in-depth understanding of489
the SAA safety baseline and its interaction with the NAS.490
The reader should bear in mind that the scope of this study includes only the491
13 FAR Parts listed in the preceding section and this fact should be taken into492
consideration when reviewing the result presented here. Even though a set of493
regulations were identiﬁed in this study as applicable risk controls for a certain494
hazard or causal factor, there is still a need for further analysis to determine the495
extent to which these controls mitigate the risks associated with that hazard.496
Potential system-level hazard sources underlying midair collision can be ana-497
lyzed according to the Hazard Classiﬁcation and Analysis System (HCAS) (Oztekin498
and Luxhøj 2008; Luxhøj et al. 2009, 2010). HCAS identiﬁes four system-level499
hazard sources, namely, Aircraft, Operations, Airmen, and Environment, whose500
interactions impact any potential hazards within the context of the NAS. These501
system-level hazard sources are also in line with the 14 CFR subchapters.502
The causal factors identiﬁed in the SAA safety baseline can be allocated to503
these four system-level hazard sources. Likewise the risk controls derived from504
the review of 13 FAR Parts can be categorized under the four main categories of505
interest: Aircraft, Airmen, Operations, and Certiﬁcation. The distribution of risk506
controls over those categories is shown in Fig. 66.4 for the SAA safety baseline507
(IFR case only).508
Note that Fig. 66.4 indicates a distribution over the total count of risk controls509
identiﬁed according to the methodology outlined in this chapter. Thus, 31% of the510
risk controls identiﬁed originates from Part 91 corresponding to Air Trafﬁc Control511
and General Operations Rules. Risk controls from Operational Certiﬁcation–related512
Parts, namely, Parts 121 and 135, also provide 31% of all the risk controls identiﬁed.513
Fig. 66.4 Distribution of
risk controls for the SAA
safety baseline according to
the four major categories of
interest (IFR only)
Certification and 
Operations - 
(Parts 121, 135)
31%
Aircraft - (Parts
21, 23, 25, 27,
33, 34, 43)
6%
ATC & General 
Ops Rules -
(Part 91)
31%
Airmen
(Parts 61, 65)
28%
Other -
(Part 145)
4%
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While 28% of the risk controls are Airmen related, only 6% can be attributed to514
Aircraft certiﬁcation–related regulations. Thus, one can conclude that, for the SAA515
safety baseline, existing rules regulating operational aspects of the NAS provide the516
majority of controls, whereas only a minority of the controls originate from current517
regulations governing aircraft certiﬁcation. However, one should bear in mind that518
the analysis presented throughout this chapter is based only on the 13 Parts included519
in this study.520
The SAA safety baseline includes three system-level hazards, namely, Loss521
of Separation, Failure by ATC, and Failure by Flight Crew. The hazard “Loss522
of Separation” represents the case that two aircraft are on a collision course/lost523
separation. The hazard “Failure by ATC” depicts a situation where, given that524
loss of separation occurs, ATC fails to detect and resolve the conﬂict. The hazard525
“Failure by Flight Crew” refers to a case where, given that Loss of Separation526
and Failure by ATC have occurred, the ﬂight crew fails to detect and resolve the527
conﬂict. The distribution of risk controls identiﬁed for these three hazards over the528
categories Aircraft, Airmen, Operations, and Certiﬁcation are shown in Figs. 66.5–529
66.7, respectively.530
The system-level hazard “Loss of Separation” contains 43 causal factors for531
which 11 separate FAR Parts provide risk controls. Figure 66.5 indicates that 36%532
of the risk controls for Loss of Separation are provided by sections of Part 91, which533
provides ATC and general operations rules for the NAS. Operation certiﬁcation–534
related Parts (i.e., Parts 121 and 135) and Airmen-related Parts (61 and 65) each535
provide 26% of the risk controls for Loss of Separation respectively. Considering536
how closely the hazard is associated with operational and ATC-related issues, this537
sort of a distribution is to be expected. Regulations such as Parts 21, 23, and 25538
that govern aircraft and component certiﬁcation provide a small portion of the risk539
controls (7%) for the identiﬁed hazards/causal factors.540
The system-level hazard “Failure by ATC” has eight causal factors. Three541
separate FAR Parts provide risk controls as shown in Fig. 66.6. Half of the risk542
controls are provided by Parts 61 and 65, whereas 44% of the controls come from543
Other - (Part 145)
5% Airmen - (Parts 61, 65)
26%
ATC & General Ops 
Rules (Part 91)
36%
Aircraft - (Parts 21, 23, 
25, 27, 33, 34, 43)
7%
Certification and 
Operations - (Parts 121, 
135)
26%
Fig. 66.5 Distribution of risk controls for the system-level hazard loss of separation
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Certification and
Operations -
(Parts 121, 135)
44%
ATC & General Ops 
Rules - (Part 91)
6%
Airmen (Parts 61, 65)
50%
Fig. 66.6 Distribution of risk controls for the system-level hazard failure by ATC
ATC & General Ops Rules - (Part  91) 11%
Certification and Operations - (Parts 121, 135) 89%
Fig. 66.7 Distribution of risk controls for the hazard failure by ﬂight crew
operation certiﬁcation–related regulations. Only 6% of the controls originate from544
Part 91.545
Figure 66.7 presents the distribution of the risk controls for the third and the546
last system-level hazard constituting the safety baseline: Failure by Flight Crew.547
Nine causal factors were identiﬁed under this hazard and three FAR Parts provide548
potential risk controls. Among the 13 FAR Parts included in the scope of this study,549
only Parts 91, 121, and 135 provide risk controls for the causal factors grouped under550
this hazard. Operation certiﬁcation–related regulations, namely, Parts 121 and 135,551
present the overwhelming majority of the risk controls, whereas Part 91 provides552
only 11% of the total controls for this hazard and underlying causal factors.553
A more detailed analysis of the risk controls can also be performed at the level of554
causal factors constituting the SAA safety baseline for the IFR operations. Such an555
analysis is presented below with a particular emphasis on individual causal factors.556
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5
6
8
9
10
Inadequate flight plan data
Inadequate pilot read back
Altimeter setting error
Technical failure in autopilot or nav
equipment
Loss of communication
# of 14 CFR Parts controlling the CF
Top 5 SAA Causal Factors -
Primary focus areas of current regulations to control the risk associated with 
midair collision (IFR vs. IFR)
Fig. 66.8 Top causal factors in the SAA safety baseline with the highest number of 14 CFR
sections acting as risk controls
Certain causal factors in the safety baseline receive relatively better coverage by557
14 CFR sections acting as potential risk controls. The top ﬁve causal factors for558
which existing regulations provide the highest number of risk controls are presented559
in Fig. 66.8.560
The causal factor “Loss of Communication” is deﬁned as “communication561
between ATC and pilot is lost during a conﬂict in uncontrolled airspace due to562
technical failure or human error.” Forty-six regulatory sections are identiﬁed as563
potential risk controls for this factor. A closer look at these risk controls reveals564
that 10 different FAR Parts out of the 13 investigated by this study provide controls565
for mitigating or preventing potential risk associated with loss of communication.566
However, note that even though a set of regulations was identiﬁed as applicable risk567
controls for this causal factor, there is still a need for further analysis to determine568
that these controls fully mitigate the risks associated with the factor.569
The lower end of the coverage spectrum, on the other hand, provides a glimpse570
of causal factors for which review regulations presents little to no coverage on571
the identiﬁed hazards/causal factors. Table 66.2 shows the causal factors that are572
potentially covered by only one or no section-level risk control.573
Figure 66.7 and Table 66.2 help by illustrating the value of the proposed574
approach, which provides an analysis regarding to what extent the hazards and575
causal factors identiﬁed for the SAA are covered by existing regulations. Thus, the576
proposed approach facilitates the identiﬁcation of gaps in the current regulations577
for a speciﬁc problem domain, in this case for SAA. These gaps indicate areas of578
potential risk within the SAA baseline, for which current regulations do not provide579
proper mitigation.580
From the study results, the coverage and gaps in the current regulatory structure581
as potential risk controls for the identiﬁed hazards and causal factors related to582
midair collisions and SAA are presented in Figs. 66.9 and 66.10. Figure 66.9583
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Table 66.2 SAA safety baseline causal factors with the least coverage in terms of risk controls
that exiting regulations provide
t6.1
Causal factor Description
# of risk
controls
t6.2 Other aircraft effectively invisible The other aircraft cannot be seen from the
cockpit. (other aircraft may not be visible
due to glare, weather (rain), obstruction
of view by wings, window frame, poor
contrast, etc.)
0
t6.3 Inadequate tactical surveillance picture The radar picture is inadequate to al-
low the Tactical Controller to maintain
separation in a plannable conﬂict, e.g.,
incomplete trafﬁc picture or picture with
overlapping labels
0
t6.4 ATCO failure to recognize conﬂict Tactical Controller obtains adequate
ﬂight information but fails to recognize
the conﬂict
1
t6.5 Conﬂict due to military trafﬁc Unauthorized penetration of civilian con-
trolled airspace by military trafﬁc
1
t6.6 Weather induced level bust Vertical deviation resulting from weather
conditions
1
t6.7 Level bust results in conﬂict Given a level bust occurs, the aircraft
has separation infringement with another
aircraft
1
t6.8 ACAS avoidance invalidated by other air-
craft
ACAS avoidance action is canceled out
by incorrect action from the other aircraft
1
t6.9 Flight crew fail to observe visible aircraft
in time
Pilots fail to observe visible aircraft in
time to make avoidance action
1
t6.10 Pilot fails to take avoidance action in time Pilots fail to make appropriate avoidance
action, having observed the other aircraft
with sufﬁcient time to take the necessary
action
1
t6.11 Visual avoidance invalidated by other air-
craft
Pilot’s response is canceled out by oppos-
ing maneuver from the other aircraft
1
t6.12 Ineffective visual warning on other air-
craft
Pilots on the conﬂicting aircraft fail to
resolve the conﬂict using see and avoid
techniques, given similar failure on the
subject aircraft
1
presents 14 CFR sections that act as potential risk controls for causal factor #16584
“loss of communication between ATC and pilot.” Within the hierarchy of the SAA585
safety baseline, CF16 is associated with Hazard #1 “loss of separation.” A closer586
inspection of Fig. 66.10 shows that CF16 is controlled by four distinct grouping587
(i.e., subchapter) of 14 CFR Parts. In other words, to address hazards related to loss588
of communication between ATC, the applicability of the individual sections cover-589
ing these four separate domains of interest need to be investigated to demonstrate590
that a baseline level of safety is achieved regardless of whether the operation is591
manned or unmanned. Not all the causal factors of the SAA baseline are covered by592
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Midair Collision
Loss of Separation Failure by ATC Failure by Flight CrewNormalOperations Mishap(IFR)
Hazard-1 Hazard-2 Hazard-3
CF16
Lost of Communication Between ATC
and Pilot
Communication between ATC and pilot is
lost due to technical failure or human
error
21.303,
21.305,
21.607,
21.609,
21.611,
21.619.
Part 21
65.31, 65.33,
65.35, 65.37,
65.39, 65.45,
65.49, 65.50.
Part 65
121.409, 121.411,
121.415, 121.417,
121.427, 121.913,
121.915, 121.153,
121.383, 121.433,
121.434, 121,439,
121,440, 121.441.
Part 121
23.1301,
23.1303,
23.1309,
23.1323,
23.1307,
Part 23
25.1301,
25.1303,
23.1309,
25.1323,
25.1307,
Part 25
27.1301
27.1309
27.1307
Part 27
91.185,
Part 91
135.19
Part 135
Aircraft Certification Airmen
General
Ops Operations
Fig. 66.9 Section level regulatory risk controls identiﬁed for CF 16 in the SAA safety baseline
CF10 CF59
Avoidance maneuver invalidated by 
the intruder
Pilot's response is cancelled out by
opposing maneuver from the other
aircraft.
GAP: No Linkage 
to Regulations
Inadequate Radar Surveillance
Picture
The radar picture is inadequate to allow
the controller to maintain separation in a
plannable conflict, e.g.  incomplete traffic
picture or picture with overlapping labels.
Midair Collision
Loss of Separation Failure by ATC Failure by Flight CrewNormalOperations Mishap
Hazard-1 Hazard-2 Hazard-3
Fig. 66.10 Potential gap in the existing regulations. No risk controls were identiﬁed for CF 10
and CF 59 in the SAA safety baseline
an existing regulation acting as risk control, indicating a potential gap in the existing593
regulatory structure. For example, Fig. 66.10 provides two causal factors in the IFR594
SAA baseline, for which no regulatory risk controls were identiﬁed from within the595
13 FAR Parts included in this study.596
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66.9 Concluding Remarks597
Ongoing efforts to develop rules and requirements for UAS SAA underlines the598
need to understand to what extent existing regulations cover SAA related hazards.599
In this context, this study presents a methodology that can be used to deﬁne a600
minimum set of risk controls based on current rules and regulations to control or601
mitigate hazards and causal factors related to a certain operation or technology.602
The value of the presented approach lies in the structured analysis to identify the603
existing regulatory coverage for the risks present in a certain domain. In particular,604
it provides an analysis regarding the extent to which hazards and causal factors605
identiﬁed for that domain are covered by existing regulations. Thus, the proposed606
approach facilitates the identiﬁcation of gaps in the current regulations for a speciﬁc607
risk or domain.608
The regulatory-basedmethodology (Regulatory-basedCausal Factor Framework,609
RCFF) was applied to the domain of midair collision and See and Avoid (SAA).610
The study provided the identiﬁcation of a set of hazards and underlying causal611
factors for (near) midair collision and SAA concept based on a causal model.612
The midair collision scenario was modeled as an Event Sequence Diagram with613
underlying Fault Trees that further detail the underlying causal factors within614
the context of IFR-only commercial air transport operations. The causal model615
provided an initial set of hazards and causal factors for the near midair col-616
lision and the SAA concept, which was consequently employed to identify a617
minimum set of risk controls for the SAA baseline using current rules and618
regulations.619
The resulting SAA safety baseline is comprised of three hazards, 60 underlying620
causal factors, and a large number of applicable regulatory risk controls. While621
studying aviation regulations as potential risk controls for the identiﬁed hazards and622
causal factors, an initial set of FAR Parts representative of all major areas of interest623
in 14 CFR was selected and included in the scope of this study. Risk controls deﬁned624
in the reviewed set of regulations were identiﬁed at the sections level. Finally, a625
systems-level analysis of risk controls was presented along with a more detailed626
look at the distributions with respect to the individual hazards and causal factors627
within the SAA safety baseline.628
Although this study concentrates on the SAA problem domain, the proposed629
approach, coupled with the RCFF concept, is intended to be used for system-level630
safety analysis and assessment of other core areas of interest such as command,631
control, and communication for UAS integration into the NAS.632
The outcome and the potential value of this study can be surmised as follows:633
• It presents a structured approach to determine existing regulatory risk controls in634
the NAS for hazards related to a speciﬁc problem domain, e.g., a new technology.635
It is argued that the identiﬁed risk controls along with the set of hazards constitute636
a baseline for conducting safe operations within the context of that speciﬁc637
problem domain. This safety baseline establishes potential safety minimums that638
apply to all current and emergent operations, such as UAS. Consequently, the639
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safety baseline concept can be used to outline an initial set of safety provisions640
that apply to the UAS within the context a particular area of interest such as SAA641
in the NAS.642
• It identiﬁes a preliminary set of current risk controls for SAA in the NAS based643
on a selected group of aviation rules and regulations. The resulting analysis644
of the risk controls indicates to what extent the current regulations act as risk645
controls for hazards associated with the SAA in the NAS. This analysis can also646
be used to provide an understanding of potential gaps in the existing regulatory647
structure by identifying the hazards and underlying causal factors for which648
current regulations provide potentially no or limited mitigation. Since it is argued649
that the same set of risk controls apply to all operations in the NAS, they may650
also provide a roadmap for outlining safety provisions for the UAS within the651
context for which the risk controls where identiﬁed.652
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